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Ictroduction - 
1. Regarding the division of labour'among tne Centres, the "CGIAR 
Priorities and Future Strategies" L/ noted that the present pattern is the 
result of an historical process, not of syst2matic planning. Centres wer2 
added one at a time with littls forethought of the size and complexity to 
which :he w'nole System was to grow by the mid-1980's. .ti impressive array 
of responsibilitss is currently distributed across the Centres in the 
System. TX's recommendations on the activities to be pursued by the 
Centres in line with the System's priorities have.been accepted by the 
Group. In respect to the distribution of responsibilities, TX had 
commented that :Se current patt2rn may not necessarily be the most 
- - . ei::rcient or cost-effective one, and the Group requested "XC to provide 
counsel and guidelines on how responsibili:ies ought to be shared ix the 
context of the goal of the CGIAX. 
7 -. Considerable progress in the direction of increased efficiency ks 
already resulted from adjustments made by individual Cen:r2s in d2riving- 
operational mandates from their formal mandates, as well as through 
inter-Centre cooperation. In several instances in the past, 'XC has had a 
role in promoting fruitful dialogue berween Cen:res wit5 overlappl3g 
responsibilities. The future is likely to witness a cotitinuai role for TX 
to assist in defining strategies and responsibilities for activities that 
involve more than one Centra. Sometimes this need will arise from chaaging 
circumstances and sometimes it will arise because of differing views of 
their respective responsibilities by the Centres tl~emseives. ZT, both 
c.ases , recognized procedures would be desirable for resolving the issues 
that arise. 
3. TX has already proposed mechanisms for revising priorities and 
monitoring their implementation. These mechanisms will constitute a 
powerful means of maintaining an overview of changes and trends in the 
System, including the sharing df r2sponsibilities among Centres. 
4. This paper discusses some of the underiyiag principles that relate 
to the definition of Centre mandates and considers their implications for 
sharing responsibilities among Centres. A procedure is outlined that could 
be followed whea it becomes necessary for TdC to formulate new strategies 
for inter-Centre collaboration or to clarify the respective roles of 
Centres with overlapping mandates. 
?,ackzround 
2. The Centres have already developed an impressive iaventory of 
collaborative activities L/, making us2 of com?lenentary strengr'ns and 
j,/ CGI-AR Friorities and Future Strategies (AGR/TAC:U?./85/i8 (1936)) 
P./ In:er-Centre Coopera:Lon - -Actual and Potential (AGB/T-~C:I-~~/Sj/5) 
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opportunities. .knong these activities have been networking, collection 
and exchange of germplasm, collabora:ive research, secondment and 
outposting of staff, joint nurserips, joint publications, joint training 
courses and seminars, and others. As the Centres continue to evolve 
from a loose federation of independent institutions towards a more 
coherent CG1A.X System, new opportunities for collaboration will arise, 
but areas of potentially undesirable overlap in responsibilities will 
also be encountered and will call for more frequent r2definition of the 
operational aspects of each Centre’s activities. 
6. When overlapping responsibilities cannot easily be avoided, 
Centre managements say be tempted to solve the problems that arise 
through a pragmatic approach, using criteria to which each could zest 
readily agree. 3ut these criteria sight not be consis:ent wi:h the 
underlying principles from which the CG1.W System draws its’strength. 
It is first necessary, therefore, to consider how the definition of 
Centre responsibilities relates to these principles. 
7. The original concept of an international centr2 had several 
aspects. It sought to concentrate resources in an appropriate 
agricultural environment in order :o create a cenrre of excellence, 
rather than to spr2ad those resources thinly ov2r all the national 
programs requiring assistance. Consequently, the focus had to be on _ 
problems that were of sajor importance to inany developing countries. Tn 
its sinplest form, the inandate of a centre was defined in terms of a 
single comodi:y, unrelated to territorial boundaries. Perhaps 
significantly, the first international centre to be created (E3.1) was 
given a mandate of this type: the global mandate for rice. 
8. It is gernain to the concept of an international centre t:iat 
oandates should z.ot be delimited by national or regiozai boundaries, but 
shouid relate to developing countries throughout the world. An 
iaportant aim of the founding fathers was to insulate :he governance of 
a centre from the direct influence of political considera:ions that 
might otherwise have deflected it from its purpose. With the exception 
of the host country, therefore, the board members were appointed to 
serve in their personal capacities. They were not appointed as 
representatives of countries, regions or institutions. Later , when TXC 
was created, a similar principle of mer;lbership was applied. 
9. This principle of CCL43 Cetitre policies being influenced at the 
level of TX, and controlled at the level of the boards by independent 
individuals appointed for their personal expertise, is closely related 
to the principle that the mandate of a Centre should not be defined in 
tems that are related to territorial boundaries. If it were so 
defined, it is inevitable that, over a period of tine, there -would be 
irresistible pressure for aore direct governaental influence or for 
represen:ation on the board of trustees by countries served by the 
mandate. 32yr2sentation ox the board by only one country, wher2 :he 
Centre happened :o be situatad, would be ~223 as ukair. 
IO. It is these underlying principles that dis:inguish an 
international centre from a regional research institution. It foilows 
that a regional nandate, based on political boundaries, is inconsistent 
with the concept of an in:ernational centre and that grouping of 
countrias is not a sound basis fo: defining t’he mandate of a Centre, 
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even though-operational considerations often necessitate delimiting 
responsibilities in this -way. Whether these principles were seen in 
this light by the founding fathers; or whether they were seen and 
subsequently overlooked, is not entirely clear. In any ev2nt, they have 
not been consistently applied during the evolution of the System. 
Types or’ Yandate 
11. The concept of a global mandate does not in any way imply that 
ali mandates should be de Plaited by commodities. An early extension of 
the concept was to include an activity or function as the definitFon of 
a mandate. There is no inconsis:ency here, for “food policy r2searcb.” 
is not delimited by political boundaries, neither are “genetic 
resources” nor “national agricultural rasearch” . Indeed, any mandat2 
defined in terms of commodities, activiti2s, functions or disciplines 
would be consistant with the underlying philosophy. So would mandates 
defined in terms of agro-ecoLogi2s, but i: is this type of mandate that 
has led to the greatest number of problems in defining the boundaries 
between the activities of one Centre and those of ano:her. 
12. X mandate defined in agro-ecologicai terms is too broad to be * 
ccrnvert2d directly into an operational mandate. Th2 mandata of LIT.\, . 
for example, relates :o t’ne development of imnroved production systems 
for the humid and sub-humid lowland tropics. ‘To translate this nax!a:e 
into research programmes it is necessary to dtfine which commodities, 
should receive attention. Excluding tree crops, t’nree of the most 
importan: can readily be identified as cassava, maize and rice. 3ut by 
the time IITA was created, the gLoba mandates for these conrodi:ies had 
aLready been asser:ed by CUT, CLYXT and I?J.I respectively. 
13 . The solution adopt2d vas to impose the conc2pt of a !‘r2gLonaL 
commodity sandate” on top of the agro-ecological mandate and in 
potential conflict with the existing global mandates. With the wisdom 
of hindsight, this may have been a mistake. It introduced. terri:orial 
boundaries into the definition of the mandate, thus moving the Centres 
concerned towards the regional-concept and away f ram t’he international 
concept . Xoreover, if a Centre with a global mandate asserts its right 
to work on a particular commodity anywhere in the world, and a Centre 
with the regional mandate for the same commodi:y claims an exclusive 
right to work on that commodity in a given region, then conflict is 
inevitable. 
14. Xor does it help very much to redefine “regional commodity 
mandate” as “agro-ecological commodity mandate”. This avoids the 
regional connotation bu: does not solve the inter-Centre overla?. In 
the real world, Centres have to work in collaboration with 2ational 
programmes, and mos: countries encompass more :han one agro-ecology. To 
have wo Cen:res working on the same commodi:y in the same country but 
supposedly confined to different agro-ecologias would not make sense in 
practice aid Would easily lead :o co?=usion on :he part of na:ional /- 
programmes. 
1.5 . Another complication is that Centres with agro-ecological 
mandates also have global manda:es for certain commodi:ies. In several 
instances , the global commodity mandate of a given C2ntr2 is not 
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congruent, in tl,rTl.s of the distribution of that commodity, with its onn 
agro-ecological mandate. Cowpeas (IIT.\>, for example, are more 
characteristic of the semi-arid tropics than they are of humid 
environments. Likewise, both groundnut and pigeon pea (ICXSAT) extend 
well Beyond the semi-arid tropics into :he more hclnid zones. This type 
of overlapping mandate need not cause problems, however, as is evident 
from the posting of cowpea scientists from IITX to work in collaboration 
srith ICRISAT scientists at the Sahelian Centre on production systems 
involving cowpea and millet. 
16. There are many other examples of this type of collaboration in 
the System which involve no conflict of interest and exploit the 
synergistic effects of Centres smith diff erent capabili:ies working 
together. Indeed, these principles could have been universal if all 
commodity mandates had been of the glo’oal type. It would have implied, 
for example, that work on cassava for sub-Saharan Africa would have been 
done by CUT scientists norking collaboratively with ICRISAT in the 
semi-arid zones and with IITX in :he humid and sub-humid zones. The 
roles of the Centres would then be seen as complementary rather than 
competitive. 
Integration of Zfforts 
17. Although arrangements based on complemen:arity would have 
avoided problems from overlapping :egional and global manda:es for the 
same commodiey, it is doubtful whet-her all overlaps could have been 
avoided. With thirteen institutions all involved in aspects of 
agricultural research for the developing countries, conflicts of 
interest are almosi inevitable. If overlapping mandates had been 
avoided with respect to commodities, they vould 1have arisen in other 
respects : farming systems, genetic resources, food policy, soil 
science, etc. 
18. A careful analysis of existing mandates would reveal far more 
potential overlaps than have so far caused problems. For example, if 
IITX were to assert its global’manda:e for the humid tropics, it would 
clearly extend to rice-based cropping systems, for which IXX has the 
primary responsibility. In fact, Centres have inteqreted their 
mandates partly to avoid overlap. The operational mandates they have 
developed represent only a subset of the activities implied by their 
formal mandates. 
19. Now that some overlaps have come to attention, however, there 
are two main approaches that might be adopted to resolve issues arising 
from them. Boundaries could be redefined so that overlap is reduced; or 
some overlap could be accepted as either inevitable or desirable. 
Indeed, there are many ;J’EEO would argue that overlapFL2g responsibilities 
are desirable in research, in tha: diversity in the approach to the same 
research problem is more likely to produce a successf-1 outcome than 
rigid central control. 
20. The integration of efforts among Centres is a responsibility 
shared be:ween the Centres and the other components of the System. The 
ultimate aim is to achieve coherence among activities of the Centres in 
line with the System’s goals, priorities and strategies so as to 
optimize eff iciency and cost-effectiveness of the entire System. 
. 
21. The -present pattsrn of responsibilities of individual Centres 
in pursuit of the System’s Central goal is the result of an historical 
srcicess, not of sytematic planning. Centres were added one at a time 
with no realization that the System would grow to’ its present size and 
complexity . The curr2nt distribution may not necessarily be the most 
efficient or cos t-eff2ctive one. 
22 * The goals, prior,,, +t’es and strategies of t’ne System ‘have been 
modified and sharpsned over the years and will con:inue to undergo 
change with the needs which it seeks to meet. It may be mor2 
approprrats, then, to consid2r th2 responsibilities of Centres as 
Teriodic assignments, say for a p2riod of LO-15 years, depending on the 
tasks to be accomplished and subject to review and chang2 as 
circumstances ;rairant. 
23. In the way the System is evolving, the definition of boundariss 
is becoming increasingly difficult. Even if boundaries could be 
defined, it is questionable whether it would be sensible for one Centr2 
to avoid another’s “territory” in all circumstances. Nor should the 
potential for overlap deter a C2ntre for giving attention to a problem 
of a parti cular region. Ther2 are oany situations where it would be 
desirable to pool resources and to worlc in a truly collaborative mode. 
History cannot be undone, and cassava, for example, would now benefit in 
many circumstances from the joint expertise and germplasm of both IITX 
and C IAT. 
24 . In some instances, a sharper definition of resnonsibilitfes can . 
m.a’ke for increased efficiency ‘of the effort of the System while at the, 
same time serving to reduce confusion in the national programs about the 
rolss of the Centr2s involved. Thus a Cantr2 with a global mandate for 
a commodity might veil concentrate on “upstream” and g2neral maist2nance 
’ researcn, as wsil as sx2rcisiag primary responsibility -within i'nP region 
where it is locaied, whereas in another rlcgion, wher2 a different Ceztra 
has concentrated i:s activities, the research on the commodity 
specifically required for that region (including strategic/basic 
research into problems peculiar to the r 2gion) would be seen as the 
responsibility of :he second Centre. Currently ERRI and CUT have an 
effective arrangement of this kind. However, as pointed out earlier, 
this does involve a compromise on :he principle of world-wide 
responsibility of CGI-AX Centres. 
25 . If future strategies should increasingly involve collaboration 
to solve problems of common concem, rather than the imposition of 
arbitrary boundaries to avoid overlap, then it is necessary to consider 
vhat principles could be applied to promote collaboration. Individuals 
collaborate effectively because they want to collaborate. They cannot 
be forced to do so, neither can Centres. The strengt’n of the 
collaboration between ti;o Csntres will be determined by the relative 
strengths of the inc2n:ives :-hat drav tne reseaich staff together and 
those that tend to null :hen a3arc. 
26. Collaboration will be mos: effective when 2ach par:y wishes to 
benefit fron the other’s contribu:ion. It will be least when eac’h sees 
the Othei as a competitor for the recognition that comes from success. 
‘ride in individual achievements has to give way to pride in team . 
achi2veaent; and pride in Cenrre achievement has to giv2 way to prids in 
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System achievement. Above all, the ne2ds of t‘ne national agricultural 
research sys:ems have to remain the paramount consideration. 
27. But these are all counsels of perfection. In the real world, 
differences in the interpretation of responsibilities are bound to 
occur. iiarmonious sharing of responsibilities vi11 ~I~i~ately be 
achieved only through the good will of everyone concerned - from the 
boards of trustees to the siaff on the ground. TXC can irlterven2 
through its monitoring of programmes and budgets. Indeed, TAC might 
consider usLng its budgetary recommendations to resaid effective 
collaboration. TIC can also monitor implementation of its r2visions of 
strategy or it can intervene w’nen requested by one Oi more of the 
Centers involved. 3ut TX does no: consider that gr2ater harmony ;iould 
Se achieved through extensive r2~7ision of formal nandates; a 
redefinition of mandates would simply move the frontiers of friction. 
28. Xoreover, wh2n a Centre ‘nas already invested considerabie 
r2sources in a potentially:productive approach, it would not wiilingly 
transfer that responsibility to another Centre unless there were 
compelling raasons for doing so. Changes in operational mandates must 
therefore be progressive and se2n to be desirable by ail concerned. _ 
29. Nonetheless, TX considers that a basic principle for sharing . 
responsibilities should be that a C2n:re vith global r2sponsibility for 
a given commodity should collaborate sci2ntifically and in the most 
. . benefrclal manner with other Centres :hat have regional or agroecoiogi- 
cal responsibilities for the same commodity. In these circumstances, 
however, :he urimarv responsibility fcr coordinaiion with th2 natLona1 , 
programmes should be vested in th2 Centre best plac2d logiscical;y to 
fulfill that function. 
Prouosed Procedure for Reaching Agreement on Sharing of Xesponsi’bi1itLes 
30. Through its continuing work on updating of priorities, its 
monitoring mechanisms, and its routine int2raction with Center 
managements and the donor community, TXC will be made awar of those 
activities involving more than one Centre where a significant revision 
or clarification of responsibilities would be desirable. Whenever 
possible, TX’s first action will be to encourage the Centres concerned 
.G to arrive at a mutually a,r * eed and synergistic way of sharing 
responsibilities. Only if this approach fails, or on a Centre’s 
specific request, would TX invoke the following procedure: 
1 Step TX vi11 request, from the Centres involved: 
- up -to-date s:atements of their activities in the identified 
areas of shared res?oxibilities; 
- statements on proposed activi:ies in these areas in relation 
to iheir formal mandates and strategic plans for :he next 5 
years and for the long term; 
- a sidtement from each Cent- 
(a) the shared &* 
_ -2 detailing its O-XI perspec:ive of 
rasponsijili:ies and its ra:ionale for the 
views expressed in relation to i.:s long-term strategies and 
those of the System, and (b) the views of the national 
agricultural research systems. 
- . . -+ 
Step 2 -- 
Step 3 -- 
Step 4 -- 
31. 
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TAC will then review the sharing of the responsibilities. It 
will do so in light of the needs, ascertained independently, of 
concerned national programs and authorities, TAC will then 
draw up recommendations for each Centre's share in the 
responsibilities, using such relevant criteria as: 
- the relative scientific advantage of each Centre; 
- efficient use of expertise and resources; 
- credibility and standing of the Centres in the given region; 
- requests of several national systems that a Centre should 
undertake specified activities; 
- possibilities for effective collaboration with national 
programmes; 
- long-term trends affecting global agriculture. 
TAC will forward its recommendations to the Centres concerned, c 
invite them to reach agreement, and ask them to keep the 
Committee informed of progress. 
Agreements reached in Step 3 will be examined by TAC and either 
reported to the Group or referred back to the Centres for 
modification. Implementation of agreements will be monitored 
by TAC through the various review mechanisms routinely 
employed, such as EPRs and examination of resource allocation 
proposals. 
TAC envisages that the Centre boards and particularly their 
programme committees would be fully involved in this process from its 
inception. The procedure would be iterative, with interaction between 
TAC and Centre managements at all stages. It would be activated only 
when problems arise that cannot be solved with reasonable speed by the 
Centres themselves. 
